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CHILDREN'S COURT PRACTICE IN
DELINQUENCY AND NEED OF SUPERVISION
CASES UNDER THE NEW RULES
Since the United States Supreme Court decision in In re Gault,'
holding that juvenile courts must provide due process to children
subject to their jurisdiction, New Mexico's treatment of juvenile
offenders, like that of other states, has evolved rapidly from the
traditional model of informal, ad hoc justice2 to a highly structured
system, close in form to the criminal justice system. The 1972
Children's Code, 3 which replaced the 1955 Juvenile Code,4 made
substantial changes in both substantive and procedural protections
accorded children. Among the most important of these rights are the
right to counsel at every stage of the proceedings,' the privilege
against self-incrimination, 6 the right to deny charges and maintain an
adversarial posture, 7 the right to participate in all stages of the proceedings, 8 the right to confront and cross examine opposing witnesses, 9 and the right to require the state to prove guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt.' 0
Despite these changes in its procedure, the children's court is not a
criminal court. Both the United States'
and New Mexico' 2
Supreme Courts have rejected claims that differences between juvenile and criminal courts per se constitute a denial of the equal protection of the laws to children. The children's court remains a blend
1. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
2. The leading article on the traditional juvenile court is Mack, The Juvenile Court, 23
Harv. L. Rev. 104 (1909). An excellent discussion of the history of the court is contained in
W. Stapleton & L. Teitelbaum, In Defense of Youth 5-48 (1972).
3. N.M. Stat. Ann. § § 13-14-1 to -45 (Repl. 1976) (hereinafter Children's Code).
4. N.M. Stat. Ann. § § 13-8-19 to -73 (Repl. 1976).
5. Children's Code § 25(E). New Mexico Children's Court Rule 21(d) (1976) (hereinafter Children's Court Rules) provides that financial eligbility for appointed counsel
depends on the child's own resources, not those of his parents. If the child's parents can
afford to hire an attorney, the court may assess reasonable fees against them if an attorney
is appointed. Children's Court Rule 21(e); Children's Code § 38(B).
6. Children's Code § 25(A).
7. Children's Code § 25(J).
8. Id. Children's Code § § 14(B), 24(C), (D), (H), 27(A), (B), 28(A).
9. Children's Code § 25(J).
10. Children's Code § 28(E).
11. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970); McKeiver v. Pa.,
403 U.S. 528 (1971).
12. Williams v. Sanders, 80 N.M. 619, 459 P.2d 145 (1969); Peyton v. Nord, 78 N.M.
717, 437 P.2d 716 (1968).
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of law court and social service agency. This dual role is clear in the
statement of legislative purposes with which the Code begins:
The Children's Code ... shall be interpreted and construed to

effectuate the following expressed legislative purposes:
A. to preserve the unity of the family whenever possible and to
provide for the care, protection and wholesome mental and physical
development of children coming within the provisions of the Children's Code;
B. consistent with the protection of the public interest, to
remove from children committing delinquent acts the consequences
of criminal behavior and to substitute therefor a program of supervision, care and rehabilitation;
C. to achieve the foregoing purposes in a family environment
whenever possible, separating the child from his parents only when
necessary for his welfare or in the interests of public safety;
D. to separate clearly in the judicial and other processes affecting
children under the Children's Code the neglected child, the child in
need of supervision and the delinquent child, and to provide appropriate and distinct dispositional options for treatment and rehabilitation of these children; and
E. to provide judicial and other procedures through which the
provisions of the Children's Code are executed and enforced and in
which the parties are assured a fair hearing and their constitutional
and other legal rights recognized and enforced. 3
The Code itself included some procedural provisions and authorized the New Mexico Supreme Court to promulgate a complete set of
rules for the children's court.'" This spring, after more than two
years of study, the Court did adopt Rules of Procedure for the
Children's Courts, effective April 1, 1976, which supplement some
and supersede other procedural rules in the Code.' I This Comment
will survey procedure in delinquency and need of supervision proceedings' 6 under the Code and rules. Though more expository than
analytical, the Comment will attempt to explain reasons behind
rules, list authorities supporting and opposing various provisions, and
indicate where the Code and rules create or fail to solve problems.
13. Children's Code, § 2.
14. Children's Code § 4(C).
15. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 21-3-1 (Repl. 1970) is a general grant of authority to the Supreme
Court to adopt rules of procedure in all courts provided they do not affect substantive rights
of litigants. The Court asserted in State v. Roy, 40 N.M. 397, 60 P.2d 646 (1936), that this
authority was inherent in courts and that the legislative delegation was not necessary. See
Commentary, Rule Making Power of the New Mexico Supreme Court, in Rules of Criminal
Procedure for the District Courts (1972) (hereinafter Rules of Criminal Procedure).
16. The Code and rules also govern neglect proceedings. Because of the many differences
between neglect proceedings, directed at the parent, and delinquency and child in need of
supervision proceedings, directed at the child, the former are not discussed in this Comment.
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The Comment assumes that counsel for the state and for the child
will act as advocates for their clients' wishes, rather than occupying
some position similar to that of a guardian ad litem or amicus curiae.
Counsel for the child should not be concerned with "ascertaining and
presenting the plea and program best calculated to serve the client's
perceived welfare,"' '7 but rather should seek "the lawful objectives
of his client through reasonably available means permitted by law ...
(emphasis added)."' ' Other possible roles for counsel were considered and explicitly rejected as inconsistent with the spirit of the
Children's Code and with United States and New Mexico Supreme
Court decisions.' 9
The Comment's organization generally follows the chronological
progress of a charge against a child from filing of a complaint
through final resolution in the district or children's court.
JURISDICTION
The Children's Code creates a special division of the district court
known as children's court which has exclusive original jurisdiction to
hear, among others, cases in which a child is alleged to be a delinquent child or a child in need of supervision (CHINS). 2 The Code
defines a child as any person less than 18 years of age, 2' thereby
establishing the upper age limit of the court's jurisdiction. There is
no lower age limit expressed in the Code. 2 2 The child subject of a
delinquency or CHINS petition is the "respondent." 2 3 A "delinquent child" is one who has committed a "delinquent act" and is in
need of care or rehabilitation, 2 4 and a "delinquent act" is an act
17. IJA-ABA, Juvenile Justice Standard Project, Standards Relating to the Role of
Counsel for Private Parties 3 (Tent. Draft 1976) (hereinafter IJA-ABA Standards).
18. ABA, Code of Professional Responsibility DR7-101 (A) (1970).
19. The IJA-ABA Standards take this position. See particularly Part III. The introductory commentary to the volume offers an extensive justification for requiring counsel in
juvenile court to assume an advocacy position based on conceptions of the purposes of the
modern juvenile court and the values underlying the American justice system. See also
Teitelbaum, The Advocate's Role in the Legal System, 6 N.M. L. Rev. 1 (1975); Comment,
Representing the Juvenile in the Adjudicatory Hearing, 12 St. Louis U. L. J. 466 (1968); W.
Stapleton & L. Teitelbaum, supra note 2.
20. Children's Code § § 4, 9(A).
21. Children's Code § 3(A).
22. Some courts have held that even under juvenile court legislation a child cannot be
held responsible for acts committed if he is too young to understand the nature of his acts.
They have read the legislation as setting a lower age limit for jurisdiction, usually at the
common law age of responsibility. Others have held that the concept of an age of accountability is inappropriate in light of the nature of juvenile courts. S. Davis, Rights of Juveniles:
The Juvenile Justice System 10-13 (1974); D. Besharov, Juvenile Justice Advocacy: Practice
in a Unique Court 182 (1974).
23. Children's Court Rule 3(f)(1).
24. Children's Code § 3(0).
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which, if committed by an adult, would be a crime." s The only
significant question raised at the appellate level in New Mexico under
this section has been whether consumption of alcoholic beverages by
a minor, contrary to N.M. Stat. Ann. § 46-10-12(B) (Supp. 1975), is
a delinquent act. The Supreme Court, reversing the Court of Appeals,
held that it is. 2 6 The decision seems anomalous because only "children" are forbidden to drink liquor; the offense seems a "child
crime" similar to truancy or running away from home. The Court
justified its decision by saying that persons older than 18 but
younger than 21, who are adults under both general law and the
Children's Code, may be convicted of the offense; hence, it is an act
which would be a crime if committed by some adults. While this
decision follows logically from the language of the statutes involved,
its soundness in light of the reasons behind the prohibition of alcohol
consumption by minors and of the distinction the Children's Code
draws between delinquency and need of supervision jurisdiction is
dubious. Alcohol consumption is forbidden to some people specifically because they are young, making it more similar to other
behavior forbidden only to children than to general crimes, and
should probably give rise to CHINS, not delinquency, jurisdiction.
A "child in need of supervision" is a minor who has committed an
act forbidden only for children and who is in need of care or rehabilitation. 2 7 Acts giving rise to CHINS jurisdiction include habitual
truancy, disobedience to one's parents, and commission of offenses
not classified as criminal or applicable only to children as, for
2
example, violating a municipal curfew. " CHINS jurisdiction
exemplifies the theory that the "definition of delinquency does not

25. Children's Code § 3(N). Excluded from this definition are certain traffic violations
committed by persons older than 15 years of age. In an early decision under the Code the
Court of Appeals held that the children's court has no jurisdiction over a person older than
15 charged with reckless driving because that act is clearly without the definition in Section
, 545 P.2d 93 (Ct. App. 1976). Children's Code
N.M.
3(N). In re William Doe,
§ 45(A) gives the district court original exclusive jurisdiction over these violations of the
Motor Vehicle Code. All cases in the children's court are styled In re Doe because the Court
of Appeals held in the first case decided under the Children's Code that Section 36(A)
requires that a child's identity not be revealed even in appellate court proceedings. In re
John Doe, 85 N.M. 691, 516 P.2d 201 (Ct. App. 1973).
26. State v. Doe, 88 N.M. 137, 537 P.2d 1399 (1975).
27. Children's Code § 3(M).
28. Id. A number of courts have held that before a child can be found a person in need
of supervision the state must prove a course of conduct, more than a single, isolated incident
of misbehavior. W. v. D., 28 N.Y.2d 589, 268 N.E.2d 642, 319 N.Y.S.2d 845 (1971);In re
V., 34 App. Div.2d 1101, 312 N.Y.S.2d 983 (4th Dep't 1970); In re K., 35 App. Div.2d
716, 314 N.Y.S.2d 1004 (1st Dep't 1970); Bordone v. F., 33 App. Div.2d 890, 307
N.Y.S.2d 527 (4thDep't 1969).
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..stop with [criminal] law violations, but starts there."' 2 9 Misbehavior forbidden under CHINS definitions has been called precriminal, a basis for judicial intervention that epitomizes the social
character of the juvenile- court.3 0
Before dispositional jurisdiction over a child attaches, two conditions must be met: the child must have committed a forbidden act,
and he must be "in need of care or supervision." This statutory

requirement has great significance, both for understanding the philosophy of the children's court and for litigating cases under the
Children's Code. The New Mexico Court of Appeals in In re John
Doe II' 1 held that an allegation of need of care or supervision is
necessary in the petition initiating children's court action and that its
absence deprives a court of subject matter jurisdiction. 3 2 Other
courts have held that a child proven to have committed acts contrary
to law who nevertheless is shown not to need the supervisory or
rehabilitative services of the court cannot be adjudged a delinquent
or a CHINS. 3" The dual condition is not unique to the New Mexico
29. S. Rubin, Crime and Juvenile Delinquency: A Rational Approach to Penal Problems
35 (1970), quoted in D. Besharov, supra note 22, at 177. The constitutional validity of
statutes permitting intervention on such a basis has been questioned in the legal literature
and in courts. Decisions have split on the issue of whether the statutes are so vague or
ambiguous as to deny due process; holding invalid: Maillard v. Gonzales, No. 50424 (N.D.
Cal. 1971), rev'd on other grounds, 416 U.S. 918 (1974); In re E.M.B., 13 Crim. L. Rep.
2328 (D.C. Super. Ct., Fam. Div., June 14, 1973); Gesicki v. Oswald, 336 F. Supp. 371
(S.D.N.Y. 1971). Contra, E.S.G. v. State, 447 S.W.2d 225 (Tex. Civ. App. 1969), cert.
denied, 398 U.S. 956 (1970); State v. Mattiello, 4 Conn. Cir. 55, 225 A.2d 507 (1966); S.S.
v. State, 299 A.2d 560 (Me. 1973); A. v. City of N.Y., 31 N.Y.2d 83, 286 N.E.2d 432, 335
N.Y.S.2d 33 (1972); People v. Salisbury, 18 N.Y.2d 899, 223 N.E.2d 43, 276 N.Y.S.2d 634
(1966); State v. L. N.,.109 N.J. Super. 278, 263 A.2d 150 (1970),aff'd, 57 N.Y. 165, 270
A.2d 409 (1970). See Paulsen, The Delinquency, Neglect and Dependency Jurisdiction of
the Juvenile Court, in Justice for the Child 44 (M. Rosenheim ed. 1962); Dorsen & Rezneck,
In re Gault and the Future of Juvenile Law, 1 Fam. L. Q. 1, 16 (1967); S. Davis, supra note
22, at 20-22; D. Besharov, supra note 22, at 180, 299. Cf. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S.
660 (1962).
30. See, e.g., Mack, supra note 2.
31. 87 N.M. 170, 531 P.2d 218 (Ct. App. 1975).
32. This holding, prior to promulgation of the Children's Court Rules, was based on a
strict reading of Children's Code § 3(0). The court noted that at that time the Code
contained no savings clause similar to N.M. Stat. Ann. § 41-23-7 (Supp. 1973), which
provides that a defective criminal pleading will not be stricken but rather amended, unless
amendment would prejudice the substantial rights of the defendant. The holding in John
Doe III might well be different today because Rule 4(d) provides a savings clause for
children's court pleading. In response to subsequent attacks at the appellate level on petitions which failed specifically to allege need or care of supervision, the Court of Appeals
held that an allegation that a child is a "delinquent child" or a "child in need of supervision" is sufficient to give the children's court subject matter jurisdiction because the
statutory definitions of these terms include the need of care or supervision element. In re
William Doe,
N.M.
,545 P.2d 93 (Ct. App. 1976);In re Jane Doe, 88 N.M. 505, 542
P.2d 1195 (Ct. App. 1975).
33. In re Johnson, 30 Ill. App.2d 439, 174 N.E.2d 907 (1961); In re Edwin R., 67
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Children's Code. The United States Department of Health, Education
3 4
court legislation
and Welfare guidelines for drafting juvenile
3
include the dual conditions, as do the Uniform Juvenile Court Act
and statutes of a number of other states? 6 The Commissioners'
Prefatory Note to the Uniform Juvenile Court Act suggests why the
concern for care and rehabilitation recurs in juvenile court legislation:
[I f departures in juvenile court from criminal procedure are to be
justified when delinquent conduct is alleged involving what for an
adult would be a criminal act, the juvenile court proceedings and
dispositions must be governed in fact by the objectives of treatment
and rehabilitation. If the approach is a punitive one.., the procedure must adhere to the constitutional requirements which characterize a criminal proceeding.
Not only may the dual condition be constitutionally necessary to
preservation of the juvenile court free, from all the formalities of
criminal court, it is also significant reflection of the legislative purpose "to provide for the care, protection and wholesome mental and
physical development of children coming within the provisions of the
Children's Code" 3 and ". . . to remove from children committing
delinquent acts the consequences of criminal behavior and to substi3
tute therefor a program of supervision, care and rehabilitation." 8 If
a child does not need supervision, care or rehabilitation, subjecting
him to the dispositional orders of the children's court can only have
a punitive purpose.
INITIATION OF PROCEEDINGS-THE INTAKE PROCESS
The institution of preprosecution screening of cases by juvenile
probation officers is a unique and critically important feature of
juvenile court procedure. A complaint against a child for violating a
provision of the Code is referred initially, not to the children's court
attorney, but to an arm of the children's court known as probation
services. 3 9 Among the duties of probation services are receiving and
Misc.2d 452, 323 N.Y.S.2d 909 (Fain. Ct. 1971); In re Ronny, 40 Misc.2d 194, 242
N.Y.S.2d 844 (1963); contra, A. S. v. Murphy, 487 S.W.2d 589 (Mo. App. 1972).
34. HEW, Legislative Guide for Drafting Family and Juvenile Court Acts § § 2(o), 2(p),
32(c), 32(d) (1969).
35. Uniform Juvenile Court Act § § 2(3), 2(4) (1968).
36. See, e.g., D.C. Code Ency. § 16-2305(d); Ga. Code Ann. § 24A-1603(a) (Supp.
1975); 37 Ill. Rev. Stat. § 704(8) (1972); Tenn. Code Ann. § 37-202(4) (Supp. 1975); N.Y.
Fain. Ct. Act § § 731(c), 732(c), 743 (McKinney 1975).
37. Children's Code § 2(A).
38. Children's Code § 2(B).
39. Children's Code § 7.

May 1975]

JUVENILE COURTS

examining complaints that a child is delinquent or in need of supervision 4 0 and referring such complaints to the court or to another
appropriate agency." Any person may file a complaint with probation services, but before formal court proceedings against a child may
be instituted probation services must evaluate the case. 4 2 This
review, known under the Children's Code as the preliminary inquiry,
is intended to determine what disposition of the case will best serve
the interests of the child and of the public.4 The intake officer in
charge of the inquiry reviews not only the facts underlying the allegations but also the child's social history-family life, school record,
previous contacts with law enforcement, etc.-primarily to determine, assuming a factual basis for the charge of misconduct, whether
the offense reflects a pattern of misconduct and, if so, whether the
goals of socializing the child into an acceptable norm while protecting the public from wrongdoers is best served by referring the child
for formal court action or by diverting him to the care of other social
agencies, such as counseling services, informal supervision by a juvenile probation officer, alternative living situations, such as foster care,
and the like.4 One court has explained the function of intake in this
way:
The informal conference prior to judicial proceedings is unique to
the system of juvenile justice in the United States. It is a clearinghouse in which solutions are worked out under the protective eye of
court sanctioned social workers which insures the fact that lessons
will be learned and the prospective respondent put back into the
community with all possible assurance that, having had his brush
with the law, he will not return either to [the juvenile court] or the
Criminal Court. This "preventive medicine" stage, unique to the
juvenile courts, insures that no one will come to the "fail safe" point
in contact with the court and not be able to turn back. Sometimes a
simple apology will soothe ruffled feelings; often restitution can be
worked out to everyone's satisfaction buttressed by voluntary probation and supervision. 45
The special emphasis on diversion from formal court processing in
the juvenile justice system "reflects the convictions that too many
children are processed by courts, that many of these referrals are
40. Children's Code § 8(A)(1).
41. Children's Code § 8(A)(2).
42. Children's Code § 14.
43. Id., Children's Court Rule 20(b).
44. For discussions on the alternatives available to the probation services officer at
the
preliminary inquiry, see Note, Juvenile Delinquents: the Police, State Courts and Individualized Rights, 79 Harv. L. Rev. 775, 787-90 (1966); D. Besharov, supra note 22, at 159-69.
45. In re S., 73 Misc.2d 187,
341 N.Y.S.2d 11, 13 (1973).
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unnecessary and that in many cases the harm done to children by
such treatment far outweighs any benefits gained from that experience. Specifically, it is believed that exposure to court processes in
many instances contributes to or exacerbates, rather than alleviates,
'
the problem of delinquency." 6 That the screening function of the
preliminary inquiiy is well-developed in Bernalillo County is
indicated by data from a recent clinical law program of the University of New Mexico law school. Over a nine-month period students
represented juveniles in 25 cases, beginning at the preliminary
inquiry. In every case a resolution short of formal adjudication was
negotiated between the student attorneys and the probation intake
officers. 4 '

Though the Children's Code specifically states that the respondent
and his parents may not be required to participate in the preliminary
4
inquiry, 8 it requires that the child and parents be given notice 9 1)
of the time, place and nature of the alleged offense, 2) of the time,
place and purpose of the preliminary inquiry, 3) that all communica°
tions between the child and probation services are privileged," and
4) that the child has the right to have his own attomey present
during the inquiry and that if he cannot afford one, one will be
appointed for him free.' ' Probation services must complete the preliminary inquiry, whether or not the respondent or family participates, within 30 days of the first notice to the child if he is not
46. IJA-ABA Standards, comment to Standard 6.1. In some jurisdictions 80 to 90 per
cent of all complaints are handled informally at the intake stage. Id. See also E. Lemert,
Instead of Courts: Diversion in Juvenile Justice 1 (1971); Ferster, Courtless & Snethen,
Separating Official and Unofficial Delinquents: Juvenile Court Intake, 55 Iowa L. Rev. 864
(1970); President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, Task
Force Report: Juvenile Delinquency and Youth Crime 16 (1967); D. Besharov, supra note
22, at 157-59.
47. Outcomes ranged from outright dismissal to a consent decree. The author was one of
the students participating in the program. More complete information is available from Prof.
Lee Teitelbaum at the University of New Mexico law school.
48. Children's Code § 14(B). Several commentators have pointed out, however, that
failure to cooperate during intake is likely to be regarded as a sign of hostility and unrepentance and leads almost inevitably to formal court action. IJA-ABA Standards, comment to
Standard 6.2(a); D. Besharov, supra note 22, at 165-68.
49. Children's Court Rule 21.
50. In conjunction with promulgation of the Children's Court Rules the New Mexico
Supreme Court adopted Rule 509 to the New Mexico Rules of Evidence, which creates a
privilege similar to the attorney-client privilege for communications between a child and the
probation services intake officer. The privilege serves to facilitate candid discussions during
the intake hearing by ensuring that, should the case ultimately go to court, statements of
the child made during the inquiry will not be used as evidence against him. Other jurisdictions have adopted a similar rule. See, e.g., N.Y. Fam. Ct. Act § 735 (McKinney 1975);
Uniform Juvenile Court Act § 10(c) (1968); 37 Ill. Rev. Stat. § 703-8(5); Model Rules for
Juvenile Courts, Rule 4 (1969).
51. Cf. IJA-ABA Standards, Standard 2.4(a)(i) and commentary thereto.
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detained and within two days of the date of detention if he is detained.' 2 If the preliminary inquiry is not completed within the
prescribed time limit, apparently the case must be dismissed with
prejudice.
Upon completion of the preliminary inquiry probation services
must recommend a disposition of the case. It may dismiss the case
outright, informally refer the child to another social agency, or
recommend filing a formal petition against the child.' I The
children's court attorney has final authority to determine whether to
file a petition; he may file one over a probation services protest or
refuse to file one in the face of a probation services recommendation.
A petition may not, however, be filed until the preliminary inquiry is
This procedure differs from the Children's Code provicomplete."
sions, which allowed any person to file a delinquency petition and a
number of persons to file CHINS petitions.' ' These persons, of
course, may still refer complaints against children to probation

services.
THE PETITION-INITIATION OF FORMAL COURT ACTION

The petition is the charging document (analogous to the criminal
complaint) which sets in motion formal proceedings against a child in
children's court.' 6 It must set forth' " facts sufficient to invoke the
jurisdiction of the court: the identity and residence of the child and
his parents or guardian to establish venue and jurisdiction;1 8 a state52. Children's Court Rule 20(a). The time is computed from the date notice is given if
given orally; the day after delivery of notice is day one; day 30 is 29 days later unless that
day is Saturday, Sunday or a legal holiday, in which case the next court day is day 30. If the
notice is mailed, as the rules seem to permit, three days are added to the time period for
completing the preliminary inquiry.
53. Children's Code § 14.
54. Children's Court Rule 23 and committee commentary thereto. Adjudications of
delinquency have been reversed in several other jurisdictions for failure to complete a
preliminary inquiry. Norwood v. City of Richmond, 203 Va. 886, 128 S.E.2d 425 (1962);
Strode v. Brorby, 478 P.2d 608 (Wyo. 1970); contra, In re Bacon, 240 Cal. App.2d 34, 49
Cal. Rptr. 322 (1966) (based on nonimandatory language of the statute).
55. Children's Code § 16.
56. Unlike adults charged with felonies, children brought before children's court may
have no right to a grand jury indictment or a preliminary hearing.
57. Children's Court Rule 23(b). The United States Supreme Court in In re Gault, 387
U.S. 1 (1967), held that due process requires giving the child subject to delinquency proceedings notice "sufficiently in advance of scheduled court proceedings so that reasonable
opportunity to prepare will be afforded" that sets forth "the alleged misconduct with
particularity." 387 U.S. at 33. The Court cited, among others, Mullane v. Central Hanover
Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950). At least one court has held that, consistent with the Gault
notice rule, an adjudication of delinquency must be based on the infraction charged in the
petition and not on proof of some other offense. D. M. M. v. State, 275 So.2d 308 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1973).
58. Children's Code § 13(A) provides that a CHINS or delinquency proceeding must be
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ment of the offense committed,' I including reference to the criminal statute violated, if any; an allegation that the respondent needs
care, supervision, or rehabilitation; and a statement whether the child
is in detention.6 0 Children's Court Rules 1761 and 1862 permit
correction of clerical errors and of omissions in rulings, orders and
other acts of the court of the parties provided such correction does
not work injustice.6 3
The rules, like the Code, set specific time limits for filing the
petition after completion of the preliminary inquiry and considerably expand the time allowed if the child is not in detention. Under
the 1975 amendments to the Code the petition had to be filed within
45 days of filing the complaint with probation services. 6 4 Rule 23
requires that the petition be filed within 30 days of completion of
the preliminary inquiry if the child is not in detention.6 s Thus, it is
possible that 60 days may pass between the time a complaint is
referred to probation services and the time a petition is filed. The
begun in the county where the child resides or in the county in which the alleged infraction
occurred.
59. Children's Court Rule 8 provides that joinder of charges is permitted if they are of
the same or similar character or if based on the same conduct or a common scheme or plan.
Two or more respondents may be joined in the same petition if each is alleged to have
committed the same offense or the offenses which they are alleged to have committed are
part of a common scheme or plan or are so closely related in time, place and occasion that it
would be difficult to prove each separately. In case of prejudicial joinder of offenses or
respondents the court may, after a motion, notice, and hearing, order an election or separate
trials, grant a severance, or give other relief as justice requires. Cf Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rules 10, 11, 34. The Children's Court Rule differs from Rule 34 in several ways: only
the respondent may object to joinder, and there is no severance as of right, as in Rule 34(b),
which requires severance if "the prosecution probably will present evidence against a joint
defendant, other than reputation or character evidence, which would not be admissible in a
separate trial of the moving defendant." The commentary to Children's Court Rule 8
provides, however, that evidence presented against a co-respondent that would violate the
respondent's right to confrontation, as articulated in Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123
(1968), is not admissible in a joint adjudicatory hearing. Bruton was applied to delinquency
proceedings in In re Appeal No. 977, 22 Md. App. 511, 323 A.2d 663 (1974).
60. This information is used to implement rights to a speedy adjudicatory hearing if the
child is in detention. See text accompanying notes 196-199 infra.
61.
Clerical mistakes in judgments, orders or other parts of the record and
errors in the record arising from oversight or omission may be corrected by the
court at any time and after such notice, if any, as the court orders.
62.
Error or defect in any ruling, order, act or omission by the court or by any
of the parties is not grounds for granting a new hearing or for setting aside a
verdict, for vacating, modifying or otherwise disturbing a judgment or order,
unless refusal to take any such action appears to the court inconsistent with
substantial justice.
63. Cf In re John Doe III, 87 N.M. 170, 531 P.2d 218 (Ct. App. 1975); discussed supra
at note 32.
64. Children's Code § 14(D).
65. See note 52 supra for computation of time.
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rule provides essentially the same time limits for children held in
detention that the Code provided. A petition against a detained child
must be filed within two days of the date of detention;6 6 the preliminary inquiry and the decision to file a petition must be complete
within two days after the child is first detained. The court must
appoint counsel for an unrepresented child within five days of filing
the petition. 6 The language of the rule and its commentary call the
appointment "automatic," indicating that appointing counsel is
mandatory and may not be waived by the child. The child is not
required to answer the petition.6 8
After the petition is filed the court must issue to the respondent a
summons with a copy of the petition attached requiring him to
appear for the adjudicatory hearing. 6 9 Rule 6, governing issuance of
the summons, makes several changes from the requirements of the
Code;70 the most important is that issuing a summons to a person
does not necessarily make him a party to the suit. Related to this is
the requirement of Rule 6 that an informational copy of the
summons and petition be served on the child's parents, guardian or
custodian. Though parents are notified of an action against their
child, a CHINS or delinquency proceeding does not purport to
adjudicate any of their rights and is solely a suit between the child
and the state. 7' If the parents are not living together and if the
parental rights of neither have been terminated by court order, an
informational copy must be served on each parent.
66. Children's Court Rule 23(c)(2).
67. Children's Court Rule 23(d).
68. Children's Court Rule 4.
69. Children's Court Rule 6. The Code required that the summons indicate the time at
which the hearing would be held; the rules change this because, as the committee commentary to Rule 6 explains, the time limit for beginning the hearing does not begin to run until
the petition is served on the respondent. Thus, the date for the hearing is not likely to have
been set when the summons issues. Service of the summons on the respondent must be in
accordance with Rule 4 of the Rules of Civil Procedure unless the court directs service by
mail. Service of informational copies is by certified mail unless the court directs otherwise.
Children's Court Rules 6(d) and (g). Rule 5(d)(2) and the commentary thereto explain the
new procedure of service by mail. "Mailing" means placing the document in an outgoing
mail container which is maintained solely for receiving outgoing mail of the serving
attorney. The container must regularly and frequently be delivered to the United States
Postal Service. Service by mail is complete upon mailing.
70. The child's spouse, if any, no longer need be notified, and the summons need not
contain an advice of rights. Cf Children's Code § § 18 and 19.
71. Implicit in the holding of In re Jane Doe, 88 N.M. 505, 542 P.2d 1195 (Ct. App.
1975), is that parents of a child subject to a delinquency or CHINS proceeding are not
parties to the proceeding and have no standing to litigate though, as a result of the proceeding, they may lose custody of their child temporarily. The basis of the holding is that the
loss of custody is temporary because dispositions under the Children's Code are of limited
duration.
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CHILDREN IN DETENTION

The preliminary inquiry and petition procedures discussed above
apply to all children subject to proceedings under the Children's
Code. This section will treat procedures affecting only those children
who are "taken into custody" by police (the equivalent of an arrest
for an adult)7 2 and/or detained prior to formal or informal resolution of charges against them. It is important to recognize that,
despite the noncriminal aspects of the children's court, statutory
provisions and court rules governing taking into custody extend the
protections afforded arrested adults to juveniles. Older cases in other
jurisdictions commonly held that limits on criminal arrest did not
extend to protect juveniles. 7" An arrest warrant may be issued for a
child under the same circumstances 74 in which an arrest warrant for
an adult would properly issue.7 While the rules do not deal with
warrantless arrests, the Code permits taking a child into custody
when there are reasonable grounds' 6 to believe he has committed a
delinquent act 7 7 or has run away from home. 78 This provision
extends to juvenile matters the constitutional limitations on warrantless arrest developed in cases against adults, probably including the
preference for an arrest warrant 7 9 and the requirement that probable
cause to believe an offense was committed 8 0 exist prior to arrest.
The Code also gives a probation services officer limited authority to
72. Children's Code § 20. The Code uses this term rather than "arrest" to emphasize the
noncriminal aspect of the juvenile court.
73. In re L., 25 Ohio Op.2d 369, 194 N.E.2d 797 (Juv. Ct., Cuyahoga Co. 1963);In re
R., 274 Cal. App.2d 749, 79 Cal. Rptr. 247 (1969); See S. Davis, supra note 22, at 38-51;
Ferster & Courtless, The Beginning of Juvenile Justice, Police Practices,and the Juvenile
Officer, 22 Vand. L. Rev. 567, 575-89 (1969); Wilson, The Police and the Delinquent in
Two Cities, in Controlling Delinquent 9, 10 (S. Wheeler ed. 1968).
74. See D. Besharov, supra note 22, at 103-04.
75. Children's Court Rule 24(a). The substantive procedures are set out in Rules of
Criminal Procedure, Rules 14 and 16. The major difference is that a magistrate may not
issue the arrest warrant: only a judge of the district court or the children's court may.
Similarly a bench warrant may be issued against a child who fails to appear in court after
having agreed in writing or been ordered by a court to do so. Children's Court Rule 24(b).
This provision is substantially similar to Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 15(b).
76. Children's Court Rule 3(g) defines the terms probable cause, reasonable cause, and
reasonable grounds, which are used interchangeably throughout the Code, as equivalent.
77. Children's Code § 20(C).
78. Children's Code § 20(E). The Code specifically authorizes warrantless arrest of a
child alleged to be in need of supervision only if he has run away. But part D of Section 20
also permits a law enforcement officer to take into custody a child in dangerous circumstances. This provision may apply only to neglect situations, or it may be construed to
permit warrantless custody in some CHINS situations. Cf. discussion regarding search warrants infra at text accompanying notes 155-156.
79. Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89 (1964).
80. Giordenello v. United States, 357 U.S. 480 (1958); Wong Sun v. United States, 371
U.S. 471 (1963).
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take into custody and detain a child under his supervision when he
reasonably believes the child has violated conditions of probation or
is about to leave the jurisdiction. 8'
Within 24 hours8 2 after a child is taken into custody he must be
released to his parents, guardian or custodian; released upon his
written promise to appear before the court;8 3 taken to probation
services or a place of detention designated by the court; or taken to a
medical treatment facility if it appears he is suffering from a physical
or mental condition which requires prompt diagnosis or treatment.8 4
During this period of custody the child may be questioned but
only in the presence of his parent, guardian, custodian or counsel.8 5
No statements will be admissible into evidence at any hearing unless
the child is given what amount to Miranda warnings.8 6 The Code and
Rules, it should be noted, only address interrogation by police or
children's court personnel. A recent Court of Appeals decision suggests that similar protection may be lacking in other settings. In In re
John Doe ViI"
the court considered the application of Miranda
and concluded that, because full warning would frustrate the
counseling function of school officials, advice of rights need not be
81. Children's Code § 8(B).
82. This provision of the Rules makes more specific Children's Code § 21(A), which
requires that the policeman take this action "with all reasonable speed." While the rules do
not exclude this provision from the general computation of time rule discussed supra note
52, it should be so interpreted because the difficulty of finding judges to preside over such
matters which justifies the general rule does not affect this stage, and there is a strong
interest in limited custodial detention of a child. The term "take into custody" must be
distinguished from the term "detention." The former is equivalent to "arrest," the latter to
"hold in jail."
83. This promise is only to appear in court; it need not be a promise to appear at the
preliminary inquiry, since participation in the latter is voluntary. Children's Code § 14(B).
This provision is slightly altered from the analogous Code provision, which requires that the
child's parents promise to bring the child to court. Requiring the child to promise is more
consistent with the fact that the proceeding is directed against him, not his parents.
84. Children's Court Rule 25.
85. Children's Code § 25(A) forbids questioning a child except in the presence of one of
these persons. The only exception is that a child may be questioned to determine his
identity. Cf IJA-ABA Standards, Standard 2.4(a)(i) (counsel should be provided a child as
soon as he is taken into custody).
86. Children's Court Rule 25(b). This rule implements Children's Code § 25(B), which
forbids use of uncounseled statements of a child until after the adjudicatory hearing, and
Section 25(C), which provides for exclusion of any statement that would be inadmissible in
a criminal matter. Specifically, the child must be told 1) that he has a right to remain silent
and that anything he says may be used against him; 2) that he may call his parents, guardian
or custodian; 3) that he may call an attorney or have one appointed for him if he cannot
afford one; and 4) that he may have his parents, guardian, custodian or attorney present
during any questioning. Children's Court Rule 25(B). See also Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S.
436 (1966).
87. 88 N.M. 347, 540 P.2d 827 (Ct. App. 1975), cert. denied 88 N.M. 318, 540 P.2d 248
(1975).
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given. Correlatively, any confession obtained in this context will be
judged for admissibility on the basis of whether, in the totality of the
circumstances, it was "voluntary." '8 This decision is not free from
difficulty; though the court treated the matter as solely a school
disciplinary problem, at some point the investigation turned toward
gathering evidence for purposes of a children's court prosecution.
Judge Hernandez, who dissented, recognized this omission and said
that at the point the interrogation shifts to what amounts to criminal
investigation the child is entitled to Miranda protection.8"
If a policeman decides to take the child to probation services or to
a detention facility he has made a decision functionally equivalent to
deciding to take an adult to jail. This course is justified only if there
is probable cause to believe the child, if not detained, will injure
himself, another person, or the property of another person; or that
he has no parent, guardian or custodian able to provide him adequate
supervision; or that he will run away or be taken away so as to be
unavaiiable for further proceedings. 9 To implement these limitations and the express statutory preference for pretrial release, the
decision to detain must be reviewed several times. Initially, a probation officer associated with the detention facility to which the child
is delivered must review the child's circumstances to see if detention
is necessary. 9 1 The criteria which the person is to use in making the
decision do not concern the child's probable guilt or innocence but
rather social and psychological conditions indicating a need for
restraint. The probation services officer is to make his decision based
on interviews with the child and, if possible, with his parents,
guardian or custodian. 9 2 If he decides to detain the child, he, not the
person taking the child into custody, must within 24 hours9 3 notify
the child's parents of the fact of detention; of the place of detention
and its visiting hours; that the child will be released if a petition is
not filed; that if a petition is filed a detention hearing will be held to
determine continued need for detention; that the child has the right
to an attorney, appointed if he cannot afford one; and that if an
attorney is appointed and the parents can afford to hire an attorney,
88. See Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596 (1948); Galegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49 (1962).
89.
N.M.
,
542 P.2d 832, 834 (Ct. App. 1975).
90. Children's Court Rule 27. This rule omits one criterion for detention which was
permitted under the Code: that there was probable cause to believe the child would be
injured by others unless detained. Children's Code § 22(A)(1).
91. Children's Code § 22, Children's Court Rule 27.
92. Children's Court Rule 26(a).
93. This is 24 consecutive hours, not 24 hours as computed under the general rule
discussed at note 52 supra. Commentary to Children's Court Rule 26.
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they will be assessed reasonable attorney's fees by the court. 9 4
Efforts to give notice must be made in good faith and must continue
until at least one parent is reached. 9 '
The Code has adopted several policies concerning the place of
detention. Particularly, children are not, if possible, to be held in a
jail or other institution used for incarcerating adults or in facilities
used for holding adjudicated delinquents, 9 6 and children alleged to
be in need of supervision should not be housed in a facility used to
hold alleged delinquents. 9 7 Detention is authorized 9 ' in facilities
specially designated and certified by the department of corrections, 9 9 in licensed foster or group care homes, and in facilities
operated by licensed welfare services agencies. The legislature has not,
however, appropriated money to build facilities to effectuate segregated incarceration. Therefore, complete enforcement of the provisions has been stayed until July 1, 1978.1"0 In the interim children
may be detained in jails if there is no separate juvenile detention
facility available, if the jail meets department of corrections
standards for detention centers, children are not held in the same
rooms as adults, and adequate supervision is provided. 1 1 A child
may be detained in jail only for 48 hours, subject to an extension
ordered by the court.' 02 The person in charge of a jail to which a
child is brought must notify the court within four working hours or
48 consecutive hours, whichever is shorter.1 0 3 The implicit purpose
of this provision is to facilitate prompt judicial determination of the
need to continue holding the child in jail.
A court must review the decision to detain a child prior to adjudication within 24 hours of the time the petition was filed, if filed
while the child was in detention, or 24 hours of the time he was
placed in detention, if detention begins after the petition is filed. 1 4
Reasonable oral or written notice of the detention hearing, including
94. Children's Court Rule 26(b). The notice need not be written.
95. Commentary to Children's Court Rule 26.
96. Children's Code § 23(A).
97. Children's Code § 23(C).
98. Children's Code § 23(A).
99. Children's Code § 6 authorizes the department of corrections to establish and set
standards for detention facilities.
100. Children's Code § 23(B).
101. Children's Code § 23(B).
102. Children's Code § § 23(B)(5) and (6).
103. Children's Code § 23(D). Of course, since only Bernalillo and Santa Fe Counties in
fact have separate detention facilities for juveniles, these procedures must govern in the
remainder of the state.
104. For computation of time see note 52 supra. Children's Court Rule 28(d) permits
the judge to appoint a referee to preside over detention hearings. It was adopted for
convenience in rural areas. Commentary to Rule 28.
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its time, and place, must be given the child' 0 1 and his parents, guardian

or custodian.'

0

6

The issue before the court at the detention hearing is the continued need to detain the child;' 0'7 the decision is based on the same
criteria initially used by probation services personnel at the detention
facility.' 0 8 At the outset of the hearing the judge must advise the
child of the allegations against him; the right to a release hearing and
jury trial, if any; the right to an attorney, appointed free if the child
cannot afford to hire one; the right to remain silent and that anything he says may be used against him; and the possible consequences
if he is adjudged delinquent or in need of supervision.'09 Though
the issue has not been raised in New Mexico, courts in other jurisdictions have held that the detention hearing must determine the need
for detention according to the circumstances presented in each case
rather than on the basis of general rules of thumb, e.g., all respondents charged with narcotics offenses must be detained.' ' The
Rules of Evidence do not apply at the hearing, and the judge may
receive all relevant and material evidence "helpful in determining the
need for detention ...even though it would not be admissible in a
hearing on the petition."' ' ' If the judge determines that detention
is not necessary, he may impose as terms of release a variety of
conditions to assure the child's appearance at future court proceedings.' 12
This variety does not, however, include release on money bond.
No appellate court in New Mexico has considered the constitutionality of this denial of bail, but most jurisdictions dealing with
similar provisions have upheld them, often on the ground that
juvenile codes usually create a presumption in favor of release, as
does the Children's Code, and require the state to prove the need for
detention.' 3
105. Children's Code § 24(C).
106. Children's Court Rule 28(c). Though the rules do not explicitly require that the
notice include the purpose of the hearing, the Code does. Children's Code § 24(C). This is
probably included within the meaning of "reasonable" notice.
107. Children's Code § 24(A)(2); Children's Court Rule 28(b).
108. See text accompanying notes 90-91 supra.
109. Children's Court Rule 15.
110. See, e.g., In re M., 3 Cal.3d 16, 473 P.2d 737, 89 Cal. Rptr. 33 (1970); Green v.
United States, 308 F.2d 303 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
111. Children's Code § 24(H).
112. These conditions may include placing the child in the custody of a designated
person or organization agreeing to supervise him; placing restrictions on his travel, associates
or residence during the period of release; or imposing any other conditions deemed reasonably necessary, including requiring him to return to the detention center at designated
times. Children's Court Rule 28(b). Cf.Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1 (1951).
113. See Children's Code § 21(B). See also Doe v. State, 487 P.2d 47 (Alaska 1971);In
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A child denied release from detention may demand a release hearing, which must be held within 10 days of the demand.' 14 This
procedure is entirely a creature of the children's court rules, and
differs from the detention hearing by requiring a determination of
probable cause to believe that the child has committed an offense,
rather than merely a determination that there is probable cause to
believe the child needs to be detained. Modeled on the New Mexico
preliminary examination,' '
the release hearing is adversarial:
witnesses for both sides may be subpoenaed, the child's right to
confrontation and cross examination is preserved, and a record is
made.' 1 6 If the examining judge does not find probable cause to
believe the child committed the acts with which he is charged, the
petition must be dismissed with prejudice and the child released. If
the judge finds probable cause, he must again review the continued
need for detention.' ' The commentary to Rule 29 indicates that
the release hearing was interposed into juvenile court proceedings
because the drafting committee believed it to be required by the

fourth and fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution.'

'

However, because a probable cause hearing is granted only

re M., 3 Cal.3d 16, 473 P.2d 737, 89 Cal. Rptr. 33 (1970); Cinque v. Boyd, 99 Conn. 70,
121 A. 678 (1923); A.N.E. v. State, 156 So.2d 525 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1963); Ex parte
Newkosky, 94 N.J.L. 314, 116 A. 716 (1920); State ex rel. Peaks v. Allaman, 66 Ohio L.
Abs. 403, 115 N.E.2d 849 (Ct. App. 1952); Espinosa v. Price, 144 Tex. 121, 188 S.W.2d
576 (1945); Estes v. Hopp, 73 Wash.2d 263, 438 P.2d 205 (1968); United States ex rel.
Burton v. Coughlin, 463 F.2d 530 (7th Cir. 1972); Baldwin v. Lewis, 300 F. Supp. 1220
(E.D. Wis. 1969), rev'd on other grounds, 442 F.2d 29 (7th Cir. 1971); Fulwood v. Stone,
394 F.2d 939 (D.C. Cir. 1967); Ex parte Cromwell, 232 Md. 305, 192 A.2d 775 (1963),
rev'd on other grounds, 232 Md. 409, 194 A.2d 88 (1963); State v. Fullmer, 76 Ohio App.
335, 62 N.E.2d 268 (1945). Contra, Trimble v. Stone, 187 F. Supp. 483 (D.D.C. 1960);
State v. Franklin, 202 La. 439, 12 So.2d 211 (1943). See generally Note, The Right to Bail
and the Pre-"trial" Detention of Juveniles Accused of "Crime, " 18 Vand. L. Rev. 2096
(1965); S.Davis, supra note 22, at 74-79; D. Besharov, supra note 22, at 231-33.
114. Children's Court Rule 29(a). Because of the way time is computed, see note 2
supra, up to 14 days may actually pass after the demand before the hearing. If the hearing is
not held within the prescribed time, the child must be released.
115. Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 20.
116. Children's Court Rule 29(b). Cf. Mascarenas v. State, 80 N.M. 537, 458 P.2d 789
(1969); State ex rel. Hanagan v. Armijo, 72 N.M. 50, 380 P.2d 196 (1963).
117. Children's Court Rule 29(c). Though the rule does not specify that the dismissal is
with prejudice, this is the logical result because the hearing is patterned on the criminal
preliminary examination, in which such a dismissal would be with prejudice.
118. Cases which have so held include: Baldwin v. Lewis, 300 F. Supp. 1220 (E.D. Wis.
1969), rev'd'on other grounds, 442 F.2d 29 (7th Cir. 1971); Cooley v. Stone, 414 F.2d
1213 (D.C. Cir. 1969); People ex rel. Guggenheim v. Mucci, 32 N.Y.2d 307, 298 N.E.2d
109, 344 N.Y.S.2d 944 (1973); Black Bonnet v. South Dakota, 357 F. Supp. 889 (D.S.D.
1973); Brown v. Fauntleroy, 442 F.2d 838 (D.C. Cit. 1971). When the question was presented to the New Mexico Supreme Court in 1969 a preliminary hearing was held not
constitutionally necessary in juvenile court. Williams v. Sanders, 80 N.M. 619, 459 P.2d 145
(1969).
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to juveniles actually detained and because it may not occur until
more than two weeks after detention begins, children's court procedure in New Mexico may still not comply with the constitutional
requirements outlined by the United States Supreme Court in Gerstein v. Pugh.' ' 9 Gerstein may require that a probable cause hearing
be given to any child whose liberty is substantially restricted prior to
the adjudicatory hearing, that the hearing be held very soon after
detention begins, and that it be automatic.
TRANSFER PROCEEDINGS

Ordinarily a charge against a juvenile is resolved in the children's
court. However, the Code and the rules' 2 0 permit transferring certain cases for criminal trial in the district court when it is shown that
the child is not amenable to treatment as a child.' 21 The Code
permits the Court to consider transferring a child only if he is sixteen
years of age or older and is charged with an offense that would be a
felony if committed by an adult, or fifteen years of age or older and
charged with murder.'

22

If a child is transferred he will be incarcerated with adults before
and after trial; his case will not be protected from publicity; he will
be subject to a criminal record and penalty; and if convicted of a
felony, he will lose some civil rights.' 23
The children's court attorney must move for transfer to district
court, alleging sufficient facts to invoke the jurisdiction of the district court.' 24 If the child is indigent and has no attorney at the
time the motion is filed, appointment of counsel is mandatory.' 25
Written notice of the purpose, time and place of the hearing must be
119. 420 U.S. 103 (1975). A state may not impose substantial post-arrest restrictions on
an accused's liberty without a prior judicial determination that there exists probable cause
to believe he committed the crime with which he is charged.
120. Children's Code § § 27, 27.1; Children's Court Rule 30.
121. For a recent general discussion of transfer proceedings, see Comment, An Analysis
of the JurisdictionalWaiver Procedurein the Juvenile Courts, 5 U.C.L.A.-Alaska L. Rev. 152
(1975).
122. Children's Code § § 27, 27.1.
123. The Children's Code provides that these consequences do not attach to children
adjudged delinquent or in need of supervision: Confidentiality of proceedings, Sections 21,
42, 43, 46; noncriminal effect of judgment, Section 30; incarceration separate from adults,
Section 23.
124. Children's Court Rule 30(a). See Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 5(c), defining a
prosecutor's information. While in the usual criminal case it would be nonsensical to include
any references to children's court in the information, a motion under Children's Court Rule
30(a) probably needs to allege that the child is not a fit subject for children's court treatment, since this is a sine qua non for transferring jurisdiction to the district court.
125. Children's Court Rule 30(b).
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given the child and his parent, custodian or guardian at least three
days before the hearing.' 26
Prior to 1966 transfer decisions were frequently made by the judge
without a hearing. In that year, however, the United States Supreme

Court held that a child subject to transfer has the right to a hearing,
the right to counsel, the right to access to social records, and the
right to a statement of the reasons supporting the decision to transfer.' 2 7 This holding was based on an interpretation of the statute
governing transfer in effect in the District of Columbia at that time.
Since the decision in In re Gault,' 28 however, some courts have held
that Kent was constitutionally based.' 29
Rule 30 establishes the procedures for a transfer hearing in New
Mexico. At the beginning of the hearing the judge must inform the
respondent of the charge against him, the purpose of the transfer
hearing and the possible penalty if he is convicted in criminal

court.' 3 0 The child is specifically given the rights of confrontation,
cross examination, and compulsory process for witnesses. A record
of the hearing must be made. 31 The Code generally provides that
the hearing will be conducted "in conformity with the rules on a
hearing on a petition alleging a delinquent act."' 32 Thus, the Rules
of Evidence apply to the hearing.' 33
In many jurisdictions the only relevant issues at the transfer hearing are the child's amenability to treatment and the need to impose
126. Children's Code § 27(A)(3).
127. Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
128. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
129. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Turner v. Rundle, 438 F.2d 839 (3rd Cir. 1971);
Powell v. Hocker, 453 F.2d 652 (9th Cir. 1971), overruled on other grounds, 498 F.2d 579
(9th Cir. 1974); In re Harris, 67 Cal.2d 876, 434 P.2d 615, 64 Cal. Rptr. 319 (1967);
Templeton v. State, 202 Kan. 89, 447 P.2d 158 (1968); People v. Sprinkle, 4 I11.
App.3d 6,
280 N.E.2d 29 (1972), aff'd, 56 Ill.2d 257, 307 N.E.2d 161 (1974), cert. denied, 417 U.S.
935 (1974); State ex rel. Arbeiter v. Reagan, 427 S.W.2d 371 (Mo. 1968); Kline v. State, 86
Nev. 59, 464 P.2d 460 (1970); In re Weidner, 6 Ore. App. 317, 487 P.2d 1385 (1971);
Commonwealth ex rel. Freeman v. Sup't of State Correctional Institution at Camp Hill, 212
Pa. Super 422, 242 A.2d 903 (1968); In re Correia, 104 R.I. 251, 243 A.2d 759 (1968),
State v. Piche, 74 Wash.2d 9, 442 P.2d 632 (1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 969, 393 U.S.
1041 (1968); Mikulovsky v. State, 54 Wis.2d 699, 196 N.W.2d 748 (1972). See D. Besharov,
supra note 22, at 250. The New Mexico Supreme Court in State v. Acuna, 78 N.M. 119, 428
P.2d 658 (1967), held to the contrary. Because the Code seems to take the opposite
position, the authority of Acuna is in doubt.
130. Children's Court Rule 30(d).
131. Id.
132. Children's Code § 27(A)(2).
133. The Rules of Evidence do apply at the adjudicatory hearing. See discussion accompanying notes 187-89 infra. Further support for this position comes from the commentary
to Rule 14, which lists the hearings at which the Rules of Evidence do not apply. This list
does not include the transfer hearing. See Comment, Representing the Juvenile Defendant in
Waiver Proceedings, 12 St. Louis U. L. J. 424 (1968).
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criminal sanctions on him for the safety of the community; it is
improper to inquire into the child's guilt or innocence of the substantive charge.' I, In New Mexico, however, before an order to transfer
can be issued the court must also find that there are reasonable
grounds to believe that the child committed the delinquent act
alleged; that he is not committable to an institution for the mentally
ill and that the interests of the community require that the child be
placed under legal restraint or discipline.' ' ' Before the court makes
a finding on probable guilt or innocence, however, it must consider
the child's amenability to treatment and find that the child needs to
be restrained or disciplined.' 36 But if the child is charged with
murder, assault with intent to commit a violent felony, kidnapping,
aggravated battery, dangerous use of explosives, rape, robbery,
aggravated burglary or aggravated arson, the court needs only to
make the first two findings to justify a decision to transfer.' '
Despite the importance of the transfer decision, neither the statute
nor the rules indicate criteria for determining whether a child is
amenable to the rehabilitative services of the juvenile court. Such a
provision "hardly satisfies the requirement of a standard,... since it
represents little more than the judge's conclusion that the interests of
society and the interests of the child suggest that the child is not an
appropriate subject for treatment as a juvenile" ' '
and may therefore deny a transferred child due process and equal protection of the
laws. Though no New Mexico court has considered the issue,
challenges to such standards on vagueness and equal protection
grounds have occasionally been sustained' 39 and other courts have
avoided the issue by reading more specific standards into
statutes.' 40 A 1967 study showed that the two factors most influen134. See, e.g., In re Toporzycki, 14 Md. App. 298, 287 A.2d 66 (1972); Stephenson v.
State, 204 Kan. 80, 460 P.2d 442 (1969). See also D. Besharov, supra note 22, at 252.
135. Children's Code § 27(A)(4).
136. Cf. the dual condition jurisdictional requirement discussed at text accompanying
notes 31-38 supra.
137. Children's Code § § 27.1(A)(4) and (5). This provision may be subject to an equal
protection attack. But cf. United States v. Bland, 472 F.2d 1329 (D.C. Cir. 1972 1973),
cert. denied, 412 U.S. 909 (1973), in which a provision of the juvenile code which defined
the age limitations on "child" for purposes of juvenile court jurisdiction differentially on
the basis of the offense charge was held not to deny equal protection or due process.
138. S. Davis, supra note 22, at 112-13.
139. People v. Fields, 388 Mich. 66, 199 N.W.2d 217 (1972), aff'd, 391 Mich. 206, 216
N.W.2d 51 (1974); Summers v. State, 248 Ind. 551, 230 N.E.2d 320 (1967); D.M.N. v.
State, 129 Ga. App. 165, 199 S.E.2d 114 (1973).
140. State v. Gibbs, 94 Idaho 908, 500 P.2d 209 (1972); but see People v. Fields, 388
Mich. 66, 199 N.W.2d 217 (1972), aff'd, 391 Mich. 206, 216 N.W.2d 51 (1974), in which
the Michigan Supreme Court rejected the attempt of the Michigan Court of Appeals to do
this. The United States Supreme Court in an appendix to Kent recommended the following
criteria-
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tial in transfer decisions were the seriousness of the offense and the
juvenile's past history.' ''
If the judge does decide to transfer the child to district court'42
the children's court jurisdiction terminates,1 4 and the right to bail
attaches.l 44 The transfer order is immediately appealable because of
the loss of protections which it effects.' 41
The Code bars criminal proceedings in the district court if the
children's court has begun taking evidence in an adjudicatory hearing
or has accepted a child's admission.' 46 This position is consistent
1. The seriousness of the alleged offense to the community and whether
the protection of the community requires waiver.
2. Whether the alleged offense was committed in an aggressive, violent,
premeditated or willful manner.
3. Whether the alleged offense was against persons or against property,
greater weight being given to offenses against persons especially if personal
injury resulted.
4. The prosecutive merit of the complaint, i.e., whether there is evidence
upon which a Grand Jury may be expected to return an indictment....
5. The desirability of trial and disposition of the entire offense in one court
when the juvenile's associates in the alleged offense are adults who will be
charged with a crime in the [criminal court].
6. The sophistication and maturity of the juvenile as determined by consideration of his home, environmental situation, emotional attitude and
pattern of living.
7. The record and previous history of the juvenile....
8. The prospects for adequate protection of the public and the likelihood
of reasonable rehabilitation of the juvenile (if he is found to have committed
the alleged offense) by the use of procedures, services and facilities currently
available to the Juvenile Court.
383 U.S. at 566-67.
141. President's Commission on Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice,
supra note 46, Appendix B, Table 5 at 78. See generally, S. Davis, supra note 22, at 112-21,
D. Besharov, supra note 22, at 256-59.
142. The rules do not require the judge to state his reasons for deciding to transfer. If
Kent is constitutionally based, this may be a defect in the rules. See text accompanying note
140 supra.
143. Children's Code § § 27(C) and 27.1(B).
144. Children's Court Rule 30(e). See the discussion of disposition of children convicted
after transfer at text accompanying note 227 infra. The Court of Appeals held in State v.
Howell,
N.M.
, 546 P.2d 858 (Ct. App. 1976), that the six-month time limit on
criminal trials (Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 37) begins to run, not from the date the
transferred child was taken into custody or the petition filed, but from the date a criminal
complaint is filed in district court. This rule is justified, the court said, because of the
noncriminal nature of children's court proceedings and because Rule 37 speaks in terms of
arrest on a criminal charge. This reasoning is not sound because the six-month rule is
designed to protect the right to speedy trial and classification of children's court proceedings as noncriminal to evade the rule seems as unjustified in the context of the speedy trial
right as it does in the context of the rights to counsel, notice, confrontation, proof of guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt, and protection against double jeopardy. See In re Gault, 387
U.S. 1 (1 9 6 7 );In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970); Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519 (1975).
145. In re John Doe II, 86 N.M. 37, 519 P.2d 133 (Ct. App. 1974).
146. Children's Code § 25(I).
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with the United States Supreme Court holding in Breed v. Jones" 47
that the double jeopardy clause forbids transfer to a criminal court
after an adjudicatory hearing has begun in the juvenile court.
PREADJUDICATORY HEARING PROCEDURES
The only mention in the Code and rules of pretrial identification
procedures in the children's court is Rule 31, which permits the

court, on motion of the children's court attorney, to order a child to
be fingerprinted or photographed for identification purposes.' "'
While no New Mexico appellate court has considered the applicability of federal constitutional limits on pretrial identification devices"'9 to children's court, the prevailing view in other jurisdictions
is that they do apply.' ' o
The fourth amendment limitations on searches and seizures for
adults accused of crime are more clearly extended to children's court
by Children's Code Section 25(C)(2).' " Two recent New Mexico

Court of Appeals decisions take this position.'

52

However, one of

them, In re John Doe VIII, I I 3 held that special rules apply to school
searches. School officials, the court said, will not be held to the same
147. 421 U.S. 519 (1975).
148. The order may be entered before or after a petition is filed and may be granted ex
parte. Commentary to Children's Court Rule 31. Such procedures absent a court order are
illegal and punishable as a petty misdemeanor. Children's Code § 25(D).
149. See United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967); Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263
(1967); Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967); Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682 (1972).
150. S. Davis, supra note 22, at 104. See, e.g., In re T., 1 Cal. App.3d 344, 81 Cal. Rptr.
655 (1969); In re Holley, 107 R.I. 615, 268 A.2d 723 (1970), People v. C. 32 App. Div.2d
840, 303 N.Y.S.2d 218 (2d Dep't 1969), rev'd on other grounds, 27 N.Y.2d 79. 313
N.Y.S.2d 645 (1970); In re S.,62 Misc.2d 329, 308 N.Y.S.2d 943 (Fam. Ct. N.Y. Co.
1969).
151. In a proceeding on a petition alleging delinquency or need of supervision "evidence
illegally seized or obtained shall not be received in evidence to establish the allegations of a
petition against a child over objection."
152. In re John Doe VIII, 88 N.M. 347, 540 P.2d 827, cert. denied, 88 N.M. 318, 540
P.2d 248 (1975); In re John Doe, 14 N.M. State Bar Bull. 1110 (Ct. App. Jan. 20, 1976).
Virtually all other courts considering the question have held that the fourth amendment and
cases applying it to adults also protect children. See, e.g., In re Marsh, 40 ll.2d 53, 237
N.E.2d 529 (1968); State v. Lowry, 95 N.J. Super 307, 230 A.2d 907 (1967);In re Harvey,
222 Pa. Super 222, 295 A.2d 93 (1972); In re Williams, 49 Misc.2d 154, 267 N.Y.S.2d 91
(Fam. Ct. Ulster Co. 1966); In re Morris, 29 Ohio Misc. 71, 278 N.E.2d 701 (Ct. C. P., Juv.
Div., Columbiana Co. 1971); Ciulla v. State, 434 S.W.2d 948 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968); In re
Ronny, 40 Misc.2d 194, 242 N.Y.S.2d 844 (Fam. Ct., Queens Co. 1963), In re Baker, 18
Ohio App.2d 276, 248 N.E.2d 620 (1969); In re Lang, 44 Misc.2d 900, 255 N.Y.S.2d 987
(Fam. Ct., N.Y. Co. 1965); In re J.R.M., 487 S.W.2d 502 (Mo. 1972); In re Two Brothers
and a Case of Liquor, 95 Wash. L. Rptr. 113 (Wash. D.C. Juv. Ct. 1967); In re B.M.C., 32
Col. App. 79, 506 P.2d 409 (1973); In re R., 60 Misc.2d 355, 303 N.Y.S.2d 406 (Fam. Ct.,
N.Y. Co. 1969). See generally D. Besharov, supra note 22, at 79-92; S.Davis, supra note 22,
at 54-71.
153. 88 N.M. 347, 540 P.2d 827, cert. denied 88 N.M. 318, 540 P.2d 248 (1975).
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high standard of probable cause to which policemen are held.
Instead, a school search is constitutional if the school officials have a
reasonable suspicion that a crime is being or has been committed or
if they reasonably believe the search is necessary to maintenance of
school discipline.' ' ' Subsequent challenges to school searches will
be reviewed for reasonableness on the basis of the child's age, history
and record in school, the prevalence and seriousness in the school of
the problem to which the search was directed, the need to search
without delay, and the probative value of the information used to
justify the search. The first three seem to apply if voluntariness of
consent to search is questioned; the others go to nonconsensual
searches.
Rule 24(c) permits the children's court or the district court to
issue search warrants in Children's Code proceedings in accordance
with the Rules of Criminal Procedure for the District Courts.' 5 '
While search warrants may be issued in delinquency or CHINS proceedings, a suggested form is provided only for use in delinquency
proceedings because it was believed that warrants would rarely be
required in need of supervision cases.' ' 6
Rule 11, governing discovery in the children's court, provides that
the rules of discovery for district court proceedings' ' will apply
except that requests by the child for discovery should be addressed
to the children's court attorney, not the district attorney, and the
response to a discovery request must be made within five, not 10
days, if the child is in detention. In many juvenile courts most necessary discovery for the respondent can be accomplished informally
during negotiations with probation services during the preliminary
inquiry.' ' 8
Rule 16 codifies the New Mexico Supreme Court holding in
Frazier v. Stanley' ' 9 that a respondent in children's court proceedings has the same right as do litigants in other courts to disqualify
judges. A child may disqualify a judge by signing an affidavit of his
belief that the judge cannot preside over the case with impartiality.
The affidavit must be filed after service of process but before the
154. The court cited the following cases as supporting this rule: People v. D., 34 N.Y.2d
483, 358 N.Y.S.2d 403, 315 N.E.2d 466 (1974), People v. Jackson, 65 Misc.2d 909, 309
N.Y.S.2d 731 (1971); In re State in Interest of G.C., 121 N.J. Super 108, 296 A.2d 102
(1972); State v. Baccino, 282 A.2d 869 (Del. Super. 1971).
155. See Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 17.
156. Commentary to Children's Court Rule 24(c).
157. See Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rules 27-32.
158. See R. Boches & P. Goldfarb, California Juvenile Court Practice 171 (1968). This
was also the experience of the University of New Mexico Law School juvenile clinic project
discussed at note 47, supra.
159. 83 N.M. 719, 497 P.2d 230 (1972).
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judge exercises any discretion in the matter 1 6 0 and at least 24 hours
before any hearing except the detention hearing. In addition, respondents in children's court, like other litigants, have a state constitutional right to disqualify a judge for interest or relationship.' 6 1 A
judge who has presided over consent decree negotiations 1 62 or a
transfer hearing' 6 3 may also be disqualified.
The Rules contemplate that objections to searches, pretrial identification procedures, interrogations of the child, and the like will be
raised by prehearing motions similar to those used in district court.
Rule 13 requires that motions be filed within 20 days of the date the
petition was filed or counsel entered an appearance, whichever is
later, unless the child is in detention, in which case motions must be
filed within 10 days. Rule 13 does not, however, provide that objections not raised before the adjudicatory hearing are deemed
waived.' 64
CONSENT DECREES AND ADMISSIONS
The Children's Code creates a device known as a consent decree
for resolution of cases which requires judicial supervision but not
formal adjudicatory and dispositional hearings.' 6 ' The Rules define
a consent decree as "an order of the court which suspends the proceedings on any petition and places the respondent under supervision
in his own home or the home of another person for a period not to
exceed six months, under terms and conditions negotiated with probation services and agreed to by the parties.' 6 6 If a child successdecree, the petition
fully completes probation under a consent
1
against him is dismissed with prejudice. 6 7
While the device itself is unique to the children's court, many
aspects of admissions and plea bargains in criminal court characterize
the consent decree. The child and representatives of the state, usually
probation services workers, must first agree on the offense to which
the child will admit involvement and the disposition to be entered
160. An action by a judge at the detention hearing is not an exercise of discretion for
purposes of this rule. Children's Court Rule 16(b).
161. N.M. Const. art. VI § 18.
162. Children's Code § 33. See discussion at text accompanying note 177 infra.
163. Children's Code § 27.
164. Cf Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 33(e).
165. Children's Code § 33.
166. Children's Court Rule 32(b). The rule expands slightly the dispositions permitted
under Section 33, which permits the child to be supervised only in his own home.
167. Children's Code § 33(E), Children's Court Rule 33(c). See Gough, Consent Decrees
and Informal Service in the Juvenile Court: Excursions Toward Balance, 19 Kan. L. Rev.
733 (1971).
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against him. The children's court attorney must then approve the
consent decree, and ultimately a judge must agree to the resolution
in open court. Before accepting the consent decree the judge must
determine that the child understands the nature of the charges
against him, the dispositions that may be ordered, that he has a right
to deny the allegations, and that if he agrees to entry of the consent
decree there will be no further adjudicatory hearing, and that the
consent decree is voluntary and not the result of force, threats or
promise apart from those contained in the consent decree.' 68 If a
child is in detention the court must accept or reject the consent
decree within five days of its submission to him.' 69
A child may deny factual guilt of the charges against him while
admitting legal involvement to permit the court to enter a consent
decree.' 70 In such a case the court must independently determine
that there is a factual basis for the plea of involvement. In effect the
rule permits Alford' "' pleas in children's court, but a judge is not
required to accept any consent decree.
If a consent decree is entered, the most severe disposition to which
the parties may agree is six months probation, and the judge may not
impose a disposition harsher than that contained in the agree-

ment.1

72

Prior to expiration of the consent decree the children's court
attorney may petition the court to extend the decree for up to six
additional months.' 71 If the child objects, the issue must be determined at a hearing at which both parties are present.' 7 The child
and his parents, guardian or custodian must be given at least five
days' notice of the hearing. 7 1
If negotiations leading to a consent decree fail, evidence of agree168. Children's Court Rule 32(c). These determinations may be constitutionally required
because a consent decree is analogous to entry of a guilty plea, and the United States
Supreme Court has held that similar determinations are constitutionally mandated prerequisites to acceptance of a guilty plea. Commentary to Rule 32. Santobello v. New York, 404
U.S. 257 (1971); Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969). Cf Rules of Criminal Procedure,
Rule 11.
169. Children's Court Rule 32(g).
170. Commentary to Children's Court Rule 32(d).
171. In North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970), the United States Supreme Court
sanctioned the practice of permitting adult defendants to plead guilty while denying factual
guilt, ordinarily to secure a more lenient sentence. IJA-ABA Standards, Standard 7.1(a)
permits a lawyer to participate in an Alford plea, but the commentary indicates that he
must tell the court of his client's denial of factual guilt. Cf ABA, Standards Relating to the
Defense Function, Standard 5.3 (1971).
172. Children's Code § § 33(A) and (C); Children's Court Rule 32(b).
173. Children's Court Rule 33(a).
174. Id., Children's Code § 33(C).
175. Children's Court Rule 5(c).
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ment to the decree and statements made by the child during the
negotiations are inadmissible in future proceedings,' 7 6 and the child
may disqualify the judge who presided over the consent decree
negotiations if he elicited or examined information about the child
that would be inadmissible at the adjudicatory hearing.' 7
The consent decree should be distinguished from two other stages
of the children's court process: informal settlement at the preliminary inquiry and admissions. Informal settlement at the preliminary
inquiry occurs before a petition has been filed and disposes of the
case. The children's court attorney need not approve the settlement, '78 the Code and rules do not require the child to admit
involvement in the misconduct alleged, 1 79 and no court appearance
is required. An admission, in contrast, is a formal plea of involvement
in the misconduct alleged, made in court after a petition has been
filed.' 80 An adjudication of delinquency or need of supervision
ordinarily is made, and the court may enter any disposition authorized by the Code, including institutionalization.
THE ADJUDICATORY HEARING

The adjudicatory hearing' 81 is the hearing to determine the
child's guilt or innocence of the charge; it is analogous to the trial
stage of the criminal process. For traditional juvenile courts the hearing was an informal and summary proceeding in which there was to
be candid interchange between judge and child. This model has,
however, become obsolete since Gault, and little of it remains in New
Mexico. Rule 35 provides that the hearing shall be conducted "in the
same manner as trials conducted under the Rules of Criminal Procedure for the District Courts." Consequently, the child is entitled to
be represented by an attorney,' 8 2 to assume an adversarial posture,
requiring the state to meet its burden of proof without assistance
from him, 1"8 to proof beyond a reasonable doubt,' 8 4 to introduce
176. Children's Court Rule 32(0.
177. Children's Code § 33(F).
178. While this is technically true, the children's court attorney may overrule a probation
services recommendation to dispose of a case informally and file a formal petition against a
child. See text accompanying note 54 supra.
179. Children's Court Rules 32(c) and (d).
180. Children's Court Rule 22(b), in fact, forbids making a record of an admission made
during a preliminary inquiry unless the child is represented by an attorney.
181. Children's Court Rule 34 substitutes this term for the Code phrase "hearing on the
petition." Children's Code § 28(A).
182. Children's Code § 25(E). See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
183. Children's Code § 25(J).
184. Children's Code § 28(E). Cf. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
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evidence and be heard on his own behalf, and to confront and cross
examine witness against him." 8 A child's extrajudicial confession
must be corroborated to support a finding of delinquency or need of
supervision,' 86 and the court must issue subpoenas for witnesses
required by either party.' 8 The Rules of Evidence apply at the
hearing,' 8 8 and two special evidentiary rules provide extra protection to the child subject to children's court adjudicatory hearings:
information learned during negotiations on a consent decree that fail
is excluded,' 89 and discussions between probation services and the
child at the preliminary inquiry are privileged.' 9" A child subject to
an adjudicatory hearing may demand a jury trial "when the offense
alleged would be triable by jury if committed by an adult."' 9'
At the outset of the hearing the court must advise the child of his
rights,' 92 and a record of the hearing must be made.' 9 All of these
provisions further the goal of infusing needed formality into what
185. Children's Code § 25(J).
186. Children's Code § 25(C). See also In re W. J., 116 N.J. Super, 462, 282 A.2d 770
(1971); People v. Cunningham, 122 Ill.
App.2d 222, 258 N.E.2d 145 (1970). Contra, In re
Tillotson, 225 La. 213, 73 So.2d 466 (1954); People v. Lewis, 260 N.Y. 171, 183 N.E. 353
(1932), app. dismissed & cert. denied 289 U.S. 709 (1932).
187. Children's Court Rule 10. See Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 48.
188. Children's Court Rule 14. See In re John Doe VIII, 88 N.M. 347, 540 P.2d 827,
cert. denied 88 N.M. 318, 540 P.2d 248 (1975), in which the court held that a person not
qualified to testify in felony cases may be permitted to testify in children's court regarding
an offense that would not be a felony if committed by an adult.
189. Children's Court Rule 32(f).
190. Rules of Evidence, Rule 509.
191. Children's Court Rule 36. This rule implements the holding of the New Mexico
Supreme Court in Peyton v. Nord, 78 N.M. 717, 437 P.2d 716 (1968), codified in Children's
Code § 28(A). The United States Supreme Court has held that the federal due process
clause does not require states to grant juveniles jury trials. McKeiver v. Pa., 403 U.S. 528
(1971). Rules of Criminal Procedure for the Magistrate Courts, Rule 22 and Rules of
Criminal Procedure for the District Courts, Rule 28 provide that a person charged with any
offense has the right to a jury trial, but if he is charged with a petty misdemeanor he must
demand a jury or it is deemed waived. The child must demand a jury in writing within 10
days of appointment of counsel or 10 days of filing the petition whichever is later, or the
right is deemed waived. As in criminal trials, the child has five peremptory challenges and
the state three. If more than one child is being tried, the defense has two additional
challenges and the prosecution one for each additional co-respondent. Children's Court Rule
36. Cf Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 39(d)(1)(ii).
192. Children's Code § 25(K). This provision was challenged in In re John Doe, 88 N.M.
481, 542 P.2d 61 (Ct. App. 1975). At the adjudicatory hearing the judge, though advised of
his obligation under Section 25(K), refused to advise the child of his rights because he was
represented by counsel. The Court of Appeals held that this was error but not grounds for
reversal in the absence of a showing of prejudice. The decision seems correct in light of
modern refusal to permit procedural niceties to invalidate hearings on the merits. The trial
judge's behavior, however, is difficult to understand. It may represent a judgment that
adjudicatory hearings should be conducted with no more procedural safeguards than attend
criminal trials, or it may indicate only isolated judicial hostility to assertion of rights by
children subject to proceedings under the Code.
193. Children's Code § 28(A).
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was traditionally a very informal hearing,' 9 4 as well as protecting
substantive and procedural rights of the child respondent.
The adjudicatory hearing is not the exact equivalent, however, of a
criminal trial. One important difference is that the general public is
excluded from the hearing. Only the parties, their counsel, persons
whose presence is requested by a party and approved by the court,
members of the news media, and other persons having "a proper
interest in the case or in the work of the court, including members of
the bar," whom the court approves may be present."' Divulging
information which would identify the child or the family involved is
punishable as a petty misdemeanor. 9 6
Rule 34 requires that the adjudicatory hearing be held within 90
days of the date the petition is served on the child if not in detention
and 30 days from that date if he is in detention. This time may be
extended only by the Supreme Court or a judge designated by the
Supreme Court on a showing of good cause.' 17 These provisions
materially alter provisions in the Code, which required that the
adjudicatory hearing be held within 45 days of filing the petition if
the child was not detained and 15 days if he was.' 98
194. See generally, IJA-ABA Standards, Part VII; S. Davis, supra note 22, at 123-49; D.
Besharov, supra note 22, at 265-310, 335-73; R. Boches & P. Goldfarb, supra note 158, at
107-28; McKesson, Right to Counsel in Juvenile Proceedings, 45 Minn. L. Rev. 843, 846-47
(1961); W. Stapleton & L. Teitelbaum, supra note 2, at 130-31; Platt & Friedman, The
Limits of Advocacy: Occupational Hazards in Juvenile Court, 116 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1156
(1968); Cayton, EmergingPatternsin the Administration of Juvenile Justice, 49 J. Urban L.
377 (1971).
195. Children's Code § 28(B). Hearings on cases involving juveniles previously adjudicated delinquent are not, however, closed to the public. This may raise equal protection
problems in light of the possible constitutional basis of the confidentiality requirement, see
text accompanying notes 36 and 37 supra. Cf R.L.R. v. State, 487 P.2d 27 (Alaska 1971),
holding that juveniles have a constitutional right to demand a public trial. See also Comment, The Freedom of the Press v. the Confidentiality Provisions in the New Mexico
Children'sCode, 4 N.M. L. Rev. 119 (1973).
196. Children's Code § 28(C).
197. Cf. Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 37. This rule replaces provisions in Children's
Code § 26(B) excluding from the calculation of the time limit periods resulting from 1)
time needed to take other legal actions concerning the child, including mental health examinations and hearings, prehearing motions, transfer motions, etc.; 2) continuances granted to
the child or with his consent; 3) delays caused by disqualification of a judge; 4) continuances granted the state because of the unavailability of material evidence or because of
other exceptional circumstances requiring additional preparation time; 5) delays caused by
the absence or unavailability of the child; 6) delays caused because the child's case had been
joined with that of another child as to whom the time limit had not run if there were good
cause for not severing the cases; 7) other periods of delay for good cause. This rule gives
children the same protection as adults receive and protects the sixth amendment right to
speedy trial. Because of the longer time between filing the petition and holding the adjudicatory hearing, most of the reasons listed for delay in Section 26(B) no longer justify a
continuance.
198. If Section 26(A) of the Children's Code is interepted as implementing and defining
a child's substantive right to a speedy trial, the rules, by lengthening the time period, may
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If these time limits are not met, the petition against the child must
be dismissed with prejudice unless the court finds the child was
responsible for the delay.' 9 Moreover, once the limit has passed the
child need not show prejudice to support his motion.2"00
At the adjudicatory hearing the dual condition requirement for
jurisdiction2 01 is given substantive effect. The factfinder must first
determine beyond a reasonable doubt that the child committed the
acts alleged. The court sitting without a jury must then consider
whether the child is in need of care and rehabilitation.2 02 A finding
that the child committed an act which would be a felony if committed by an adult raises a rebuttable presumption of need of care
and rehabilitation. 0 3 In all other cases the state has the burden to
produce evidence on the issue.
At the conclusion of the hearing the court must find both that the
child committed acts sufficient to support the delinquency or need
of supervision allegations, and, if so, that he is in need of care or
rehabilitation. An affirmative finding on both issues is necessary before the child can be adjudged a delinquent child or a child in need
of supervision; otherwise, the petition must be dismissed with prejudice. 04
DISPOSITION AND APPEALS
The dispositional hearing in children's court is the analog of sentencing in criminal court. Traditionally the adjudicatory and dispositional functions of the juvenile court were not separated because of
the court's duty to examine the whole child and determine what was
needed to provide him with appropriate supervision and care to
socialize him acceptably. 2 °0
An important effect of the 1960's
revolution in juvenile court proceedings is recognition of the requirement that before the state may intervene in the child's life, even with
benevolent goals, it must prove that there is a legal basis-a finding of
contravene N.M. Stat. Ann. § 21-3-1, discussed at note 15 supra. Objections to similar
provisions in the Rules of Criminal Procedure have been defended as procedural and thus
within the court's rulemaking power. Commentary, supra note 15.
199. Children's Court Rule 34(c).
200. In re John Doe,
N.M.
, 542 P.2d 1022 (Ct. App. 1976). Cf Barker v.
Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972). The court noted that demand for a jury trial alone does not
justify extending the time limit; a continuance is proper only if no jury is available within
the time limit.
201. See text accompanying notes 31-38 supra.
202. Children's Code § 28(E). Cf In re R., 67 Misc.2d 452, 323 N.Y.S.2d 909 (1971).
203. Children's Code § 28(E).
204. Children's Court Rule 38(a).
205. Mack, supra note 2, at 119-20; Comment, The Role of the Lawyer in Preparation
for a Delinquency Hearingin the Juvenile Court, 12 St. Louis U. L.J. 631, 632 (1967).
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forbidden behavior-for that intervention. 2 06 Therefore, it is inappropriate for the judge to see social data bearing on disposition until
there has been an adjudication of delinquency or need of supervision.2 I To effectuate this dichotomy of functions, the Children's
Code, like other modem juvenile court legislation, requires that the
dispositional hearing be separate from the adjudicatory hearing.2 08
Ordinarily the dispositional hearing is held some time after the
adjudicatory hearing to allow probation services to do the predisposi2
9 This study includes data on the
tion study mandated by law°.
child, his family and environment, and other matters relevant to
determining proper disposition of him.2 " Before the dispositional
hearing the court may also order a psychiatric examination of the
child 2 1 1 and may remand the child to the custody of the department of corrections for up to 40 days for a social and psychological
evaluation, usually conducted at the Girls' Welfare Home or the New
Mexico Boys' School at Springer.2 1 2
If a child is in detention the dispositional hearing must be held
within 20 days of the end of the adjudicatory hearing or the time the
admission is accepted unless the child is committed for a diagnostic
evaluation. In the latter circumstance the hearing must be held
within 55 days of the end of the adjudicatory hearing. 2' '
The child is entitled to receive notice of the hearing 2 I ' and copies
of any social, diagnostic, predispositional or other reports submitted
At the hearing itself the
to the court for dispositional purposes. 2'
206. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
207. President's Commission on Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice,
The Challenge of Crime in a Free Society 87 (1967).
208. Children's Code § 28(A), (F). Section 28(H) permits a party to move for a continuance for this purpose if the judge does not so order sua sponte.
209. Children's Code § 29.
210. Children's Code § 29(A). See IJA-ABA Standards, commentary to Standard 9.2; H.
Lou, Juvenile Courts in the United States 116 (1927); Cohen, Criteriafor the Probation
Officer's Recommendation to the Juvenile Court Judge, 9 Crime & Delinq. 262 (1963).
211. Children's Code § 29(B). See IJA-ABA Standards, Standards 9.3(b) and (c).
212. Children's Code § 29(D). The Code provided for a 60-day diagnostic commitment;
Rule 37(b) shortens the maximum time to 40 days because the drafting committee felt this
was sufficient time in which to do the evaluation. Commentary to Rule 27. The child may
appeal a diagnostic commitment order to preserve his right not to be incarcerated without
an appeal. In re John Doe II, 87 N.M. 170, 531 P.2d 218 (Ct. App. 1975).
213. Children's Court Rule 37(b).
214. Children's Court Rule 5.
215. Children's Court Rule 37. See IJA-ABA Standards, Standard 9.2. These reports are
not public records and are open to inspection only by the judge, probation officers, professional staff of the court, the representative of any agency providing supervision or legal
custody of a child, the child or his attorney, and any other persons whom the court finds to
have a legitimate interest in the case. Records of a child adjudged delinquent more than
once, however, are public records. Children's Code § 42. This provision raises the same
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child is entitled to be represented by counsel2 1 6 and to subpoena
and examine in court persons who have prepared predispositional
studies and other social reports.2 1'7 As is traditional, written reports
may be admitted into evidence without meeting the requirements of
the Rules of Evidence.2 1 8 This latter evidentiary rule provides for
the first time an effective means of challenging the reports' reliability.
Though analogous to a criminal sentencing, the considerations
which enter into a dispositional order in children's court make it
substantially different. Criminal sentences, which are basically
punitive, are prescribed by the legislature according to the nature of
the crime. 2 9 Because the essential goal of children's court is rehabilitation, the judge has a wide range of dispositions from which he may
choose, depending on the child's needs and the claims of society to
protection.2 2 Children adjudged delinquent or in need of supervision may be permitted to stay in their homes subject to such conditions and limitations as the court imposes,2 2 1 placed under protective supervision, 2 2 transferred to an agency responsible for the care
of neglected children, 2 2 3 or placed on probation.2 24 Delinquent
children may be transferred to institutions designated for incarcerating them, 2 2 s but CHINS may not be incarcerated with delinquents.2 26 Neither CHINS nor delinquents may be confined in a
facility used to incarcerate adults convicted of crimes. 2 2 7 A child
less than 18 years old transferred to district court and convicted of a
equal protection problem discussed in note 194 supra. Disclosure of confidential records is a
petty misdemeanor.
216. Children's Code § 25(E). Cf.Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S. 736 (1948); Mempa v.
Rhay, 389 U.S. 128 (1967).
217. Children's Court Rule 37(a)(2).
218. Children's Code § 28(G). See IJA-ABA Standards, Standard 9.4.
219. N.M. Stat. Ann. § § 40A-29-1 et seq. (Repl. 1972).
220. See Children's Code § 2. Other jurisdictions have struck down dispositional orders
based solely on the offense committed. See, e.g., In re Roberts, 13 Md. App. 644, 284 A.2d
621 (1971); In re Walter, 172 N.W.2d 603 (N.D. 1969). The New Mexico Court of Appeals
has held, however, that the judge has no duty to follow dispositional recommendations
contained in social reports. In re Jane Doe, 88 N.M. 505, 542 P.2d 1195 (Ct. App. 1975).
221. Children's Code § § 31(B)(1), (A)(1).
222. Children's Code § § 31(B)(1), (A)(2).
223. Children's Code § § 31(B)(1), (A)(3)(a). An agency to whom custody is transferred
may contract with private agencies to provide care and supervision, Children's Code § 39,
but the court may not send a child to a private facility and order a state agency to pay the
costs of maintaining him there. In re John Doe,
N.M.
, 545 P.2d 491 (Ct. App.
1975), cert. denied
N.M.
P.2d
(1976).
224. Children's Code § 31(B)(3). See Diana, What is Probation?, in Juvenile Delinquency: A Book of Readings 433 (Giallombardo ed. 1972).
225. Children's Code § 31(B)(2).
226. Children's Code § 31(D).
227. Id.
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crime is remanded to the custody of the department of corrections,
which may confine the child in a facility for holding delinquent
children or in an adult prison, whichever is appropriate considering
his age and the nature of the sentence imposed, subject to any condi2
tions the court may impose. 2 8
A dispositional order short of incarceration in a facility for juven22
ile delinquents may be imposed for up to two years; 9 any order
remanding a child to an institution remains in effect for only one
year.2 30 At any time before a dispositional order expires the agency
providing custody or supervision may petition the court to extend
the order for up to one year as necessary to safeguard the welfare of
2
the child or the public interest. 31 While the statute does not specify
a procedure for seeking such an extension, the Court of Appeals has
indicated that, at least if the petition seeks to continue incarceration
of a delinquent child in an institution, the court must hold a hearing
in accordance with the rules for a hearing on a petition to determine
2
if an extension is appropriate. 3 2
An agency having custody or supervision of a child may release
him prior to termination of a dispositional order if it finds the pur2
pose of the dispositional order has been achieved. 3 In addition, a
child may himself petition the court to modify or terminate any
order short of institutionalization on the ground that custody or
2
supervision is no longer necessary. 34 However, the department of
corrections has exclusive power to parole or release a child remanded
2 35
to an institution for delinquent children.
All dispositional orders entered before a child turns 18 automatically terminate when he reaches 182 3 6 unless the court orders
2
an extension until his twenty-first birthday, 3 ' but if disposition has
not been determined by the time a child turns 18, the children's
court retains jurisdiction to enter a disposition that will be effective
after he turns 18.2 3 8 This seeming anomaly can only be justified by
the need to impose some sanction on a minor who commits an
offense not serious enough to warrant transfer to district court who
228. Children's Code § 27.1(B).
229. Children's Code § § 35(B) and (C).
230. Children's Code § 35(A).
231. Children's Code § § 35(E)(2), (F), (G).
232. In re John Doe, 85 N.M. 691, 516 P.2d 201 (Ct. App. 1973); Children's Code
§ 35(H).
233. Children's Code § 35(D).
234. Children's Code § 35(E).
235. Children's Code § 35(A)(1).
236. Children's Code § 35(H).
237. Id.
238. In re John Doe IV, 87 N.M. 172, 531 P.2d 220 (Ct. App. 1975).
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reaches the age of majority before children's court proceedings are
completed.
At the conclusion of the dispositional hearing the court must
advise the child of his right to appeal. 2 ' The child may request the
court to stay a judgment pending appeal,2 4 0 and the court may
order a stay if suitable provision is made for care and custody of the
child.2 4 1 On appeal the child has a right to proceed at state expense
if he cannot afford the costs of an appeal. 2 4 2
REVOCATION OF PROBATION, PAROLE AND CONSENT DECREES
Rule 39 requires that revocation proceedings will "be conducted
in the same manner as proceedings on petitions alleging delinquency
or need of supervision." The children's court attorney 2 4 initiates a
revocation proceeding by filing a petition with the children's court
styled "Petition to Revoke Probation (or Parole)" setting forth the
terms of probation or parole allegedly violated and a statement of
facts supporting the allegations.
A child subject to revocation proceedings is entitled to the same
rights as a child subject to a delinquency or CHINS petition except
that there is no preliminary inquiry and no right to a jury trial. 2 4 4
The rules do not address the nature of the state's burden of proof;
because, however, the issue is probably substantive, not procedural,
the probable burden is proof by a preponderance of the evidence, as
in adult proceedings.2 4 s
These rules provide a child greater protection than is accorded
adults subject to probation 2 4 6 and parole revocation 2 4 1 in New
Mexico and in general go beyond the constitutional requirements
imposed by the United States Supreme Court in Morrissey v.
239. Children's Court Rule 38(b). Appeals are governed by the Rules of Appellate Procedure for Criminal Cases. Children's Court Rule 38(c). Failure to give this advice tolls the
time for taking an appeal. Children's Court Rule 38(b). Time for appeal runs from entry of
the dispositional order, not from the entry of judgment as a delinquent child or a child in
need of supervision. In re John Doe III, 87 N.M. 170, 531 P.2d 218 (Ct. App. 1975).
240. Children's Code § 36, Children's Court Rule 19.
241. Children's Code § 36(B).
242. Children's Code § 36(D), Children's Court Rule 38(b).
243. This part of Rule 39 alters Children's Code § 16(B), which permitted a probation
officer to file a petition to revoke probation in some circumstances.
244. Children's Court Rule 39(a). Because there is no preliminary inquiry, Rule of
Evidence 509 (discussed at text accompanying note 50 supra), and Rule 22(b) do not apply
to revocation proceedings.
245. See Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
246. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 21-17-28.1 (Repl. 1964).
247. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 41-17-28 (Repl. 1964). See Note, Due Process, Equal Protection,
and the New Mexico Parole System, 2 N.M.L. Rev. 234 (1972); Note, Parole Revocation
and The Right to Counsel, 5 N.M.L. Rev. 311 (1975).
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24
Brewer2 48 and Gagnon v. Scarpelli. 9 Morrissey, however, requires
that there be a prompt probable cause determination when an adult
is held for a full revocation hearing. If this requirement is intended to
prevent long pre-hearing incarceration, the time limits for revocation
hearing under the Children's Code may serve the same purpose.' 5
If, however, the Morrissey rule seeks to ensure that a person will not
have to undergo a full hearing based on a frivolous charge, the Children's Code may be constitutionally deficient because it provides no
protection against that possibility.
Rule 33 significantly alters the rules for revoking consent decrees
from the provisions contained in the Code. Under the Code if a new
petition was filed against a child subject to a consent decree or if he
was alleged to have violated a condition of the consent decree, the
original petition on which the decree was based was reinstated. Thus
the issue at the revocation hearing was the child's guilt or innocence
of the original charge, not of the alleged violations which resulted in
2
the revocation proceedings. I ' Because a child must admit to the
truth of allegations against him before a consent degree may be
entered,2 2 the hearing on revocation was little more than a pro
forma reading of the child's admission and entry of judgment that
the child was delinquent or in need of supervision. The child had no
opportunity to contest the charges of violation which actually caused
the consent decree to be revoked.
These provisions have been superseded, and Rule 33 provides that
a hearing to revoke a consent decree will be conducted in the same
2
manner as a hearing to revoke probation. 5 3 The question at issue,
therefore, is whether the child violated conditions to which he agreed
when he entered into the consent decree.
If at the conclusion of a revocation hearing the court finds that a
child has violated conditions imposed upon him, it may extend the
period of the consent decree, probation or parole or make any other

248. 408 U.S. 471 (1972) (right to prompt preliminary inquiry with impartial hearing
officer, right to notice, right to cross examine and right to participate; right to full hearing
preceded by written notice with rights to participate and cross examine).
249. 411 U.S. 778 (1973) (right to appointed counsel on request if there is a timely and
colorable claim of innocence of the charged violation or of mitigating circumstances).
250. But see the discussion concerning Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975), at text
accompanying note 31 supra.
251. Children's Code § 33(D).
252. See text accompanying notes 167-171 supra.
253. The drafting committee commentary to Rule 33 explains that the change was made
because supervision under consent decree is essentially the same as probation and that,
therefore, revocation of both should be accomplished using the same procedures.
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disposition
of him which would have been proper under the original
2
petition. 54
CONCLUSION
The new Children's Court Rules bring needed clarification and
flexibility to juvenile court practice in New Mexico while retaining
emphasis on providing fair procedures for dealing with children who
come into conflict with the law. Perhaps the most important change
effected by the rules-expanding some time limits-eases the burden
on court officials, particularly in rural areas, without sacrificing the
expeditious handling of cases against juvenile respondents.
Significant problems left to be faced by the legislature and the
courts remain: defining more clearly the substantive law governing
transfer of children to district court for criminal trial, extending
Gerstein v. Pugh safeguards to the court's clientele, and limiting the
authority of school officials to search and interrogate students. The
Code and Rules as a whole, however, provide an excellent framework
for the continued functioning of the children's court as an institution
which intervenes in a child's life only when legal reason for such is
shown to exist and then usually only to help that child mature into a
responsible member of society.
LESLIE J. HARRIS*

254. Children's Court Rules 33(b), 39(b).
*The author expresses special thanks to Prof. Lee Teitelbaum for his editorial assistance
in preparing this comment.

